Non-Interactive Liquidations

Liquidation System

Non-Interactive Liquidations

Proving Insolvency Without Wallet Linking


In traditional perpetual futures protocols, liquidations are inherently address-linked and event-driven: a user's public position is monitored by bots or the protocol itself, and when a predefined threshold (e.g., maintenance margin ratio) is crossed, the position is forcibly closed. While this system works for transparency and automation, it creates a dangerous incentive structure on-chain — where trader vulnerability becomes alpha.

SnarkSide’s liquidation system is built from first principles to completely decouple insolvency from address exposure. Using zero-knowledge proofs, any third party can submit a non-interactive liquidation proof demonstrating that a vault has become insolvent — without knowing who owns it, without revealing its location in the Merkle tree, and without leaking the details of its position. This marks a paradigm shift: liquidation becomes epistemically minimal, incentive-neutral, and privacy-preserving.


Why Liquidations Must Be Anonymous

In account-based perp DEXs:

  • Anyone can monitor when a trader is nearing liquidation.

  • MEV bots can front-run liquidation to extract profit.

  • Adversarial actors may intentionally trigger liquidations by manipulating low-liquidity markets.

This leads to:

  • Manipulated wick events

  • Unnecessary volatility

  • Reduced protocol credibility for high-value users

  • Flight of liquidity from on-chain systems

SnarkSide’s liquidation design removes these problems by turning liquidation into a cryptographic process, not an observable event.


Liquidation as Proof, Not Trigger

At the core of the SnarkSide liquidation model is the Liquidation Proof Circuit — a SNARK that enforces the following:

  1. A vault existed in the committed Merkle tree.

  2. The position in that vault had a leverage level and mark price exposure.

  3. The position’s margin and notional values implied a health ratio.

  4. That health ratio dropped below the maintenance margin threshold.

  5. The nullifier associated with the vault had not yet been used.

  6. A new commitment is created (redistributing the residual margin to the liquidator and fee vaults).

No addresses. No public balances. No event tracing.


Circuit Outline

In high-level terms, the circuit checks:

assert(position_commitment ∈ MerkleRoot)
assert(mark_price > liquidation_threshold(entry_price, direction, leverage))
assert(nullifier not used)
assert(transition_to_liquidated_commitment is valid)

The proof reveals nothing about the wallet that opened the position or even which index in the tree it belonged to.

Inputs:

Public Input
Description

vault_root

The root of the vault Merkle tree

nullifier

The nullifier to burn for the liquidated vault

new_commitment

The vault commitment reflecting liquidation outcome

mark_price_commitment

Commitment to oracle-sourced price at time of proof

Private Witness:

Field
Description

entry_price

User's original entry

direction

Long or short

leverage

Position leverage

margin_amount

Collateral posted

expiry_slot

Trade expiry or funding cutoff

vault_salt

Randomizer

owner_secret

Proof of ownership (not exposed)

All of this is kept private. Only the SNARK is posted, and its correctness is verified without data exposure.


Incentives for Third-Party Liquidators

To encourage timely and fair liquidation, SnarkSide embeds a settlement incentive structure:

  • A percentage of the residual margin (after penalty) is claimable by the submitter of a valid liquidation proof.

  • The proof must include a correct redistribution commitment, ensuring:

    • Protocol fees are enforced

    • Liquidator receives fair reward

    • Vault is permanently nullified and replaced

Importantly, this incentive does not require knowing the trader or observing the network. It is earned through computation, not observation.


Oracle Integration

To evaluate a position’s solvency without revealing it, the circuit uses a committed mark price, provided via:

  • Aggregated oracles (Pyth, Switchboard, Chainlink)

  • Timestamped commitment attested by relayer

  • Price hash included in the SNARK and verified via Merkle

This guarantees:

  • The liquidation used a fair market price

  • The proof binds to a specific moment

  • Replay is impossible

In the future, SnarkSide may support on-chain optimistic pricing challenges, enabling fully decentralized oracle-free liquidation paths.


Anti-Abuse Design

SnarkSide's liquidation system includes safeguards against false or malicious proofs:

  • All liquidation proofs must be valid SNARKs.

  • Nullifier double-use is enforced at the contract level.

  • Vault Merkle root is updated atomically with every batch.

  • Incorrect or stale proofs cannot be submitted against a non-existent or already-closed commitment.


Summary

SnarkSide transforms liquidation into a trustless, non-interactive cryptographic service, where:

  • Positions are liquidated without revealing owners.

  • Proofs verify insolvency without traceable state diffs.

  • Liquidators are rewarded for work, not for surveillance.

This system not only defends against MEV and adversarial liquidation — it also restores the economic neutrality of leverage itself. On SnarkSide, privacy is not just about protection. It is the precondition for market integrity.

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